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Abstract—Cognitive linguistics strongly opposes the classical view and alternatively claims that categories 
center round a prototype and the membership of a category depends not on the binary features but on the 
family resemblance with the prototype. This paper attempts to make a study of a common grammatical 
category—transitivity, with the aim to find the proof for our hypothesis that transitivity, as a prototype 
category like any natural category, shows prototype effects with asymmetries among members. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Transitivity is an important linguistic category and has been a heated topic for decades. Like any natural category, 
transitivity is also a category showing prototype effects. As Hopper and Thompson (1980) put that transitivity is a 
matter of degree. That is to say, there are good examples and bad examples in the category. To be more specific, the 
levels of transitivity shown from the transitive clause are different, ranging from high to low. The prototypical transitive 
clauses show the highest degree of transitivity, and the non-prototypical clauses show different deviated degrees of 
transitivity, depending on the degree of deviation from the prototype. This paper aims to explore the prototype effects of 
transitivity from cognitive approach. 
II.  THE PROTOTYPE OF TRANSITIVITY 
A.  Semantic Properties of the Prototype 
1. Experiential basis for semantic properties 
In accordance with the above assumption that transitivity is a prototype-based category, this category is thus not 
determined by necessary and sufficient features but centered round a prototype which can be assumed to be understood 
in terms of a cluster of interactional properties. It is interactional in that these properties are not objective but rather 
have to do with the world with which we interact in the way of perceiving, imagining, affecting with our body and 
gaining knowledge. They are the result of our interaction as part of our physical and cultural environments with our 
bodies and cognitive apparatus. As Rosch (1978) puts it “it should be emphasized that we are talking about a perceived 
world and not a metaphysical world without a knower”(p29). Then, what is the clustering of properties that determine 
the prototypical member in transitivity? Looking back for a moment at Hopper and Thompson’s typological research on 
the clusters of attributes associated with transitivity, we can see that verbs are not the sole factor influencing transitivity 
in a transitive clause; there are many other determinant facets. More significantly, they also point out that the transitive 
constructions have semantic values which can be seen as prototypical. This proposition is in consistent with the main 
claim in Langacker’s cognitive grammar. He firmly believes that the parameters of linguistic form in grammatical 
constructions are not independent of meaning, rather on the basis of meaning. “Cognitive grammar makes specific 
claims about semantic structure and the notional basis of fundamental grammatical categories” (Languacker, 2004, 
p183). Semantics therefore serves as the basis for the syntax. Granted that semantics is essential to, or more explicitly, 
inherent in grammatical construction, then where do the semantic values of prototype come from? According to 
Langacker, semantics means the conceptualization of human beings and the reflection of people’s understanding of 
things and world experience, corresponding to the ways in which human beings conceive things. Therefore, semantic 
structures function as the reflection of the conceptual structures. In cognitive grammar, semantic units are claimed to be 
characterized relative to cognitive domain, a coherent area of conceptualization, with three-dimensional space, smell, 
color, touch sensation, etc. basic domains and other higher level domains even including the knowledge system. 
Cognitive domain also consists of a concept or conceptual complex of any degree of complexity with the inclusion of 
highly abstract image schemas. “Meanings are characterized relative to cognitive domains many of which are idealized 
cognitive models in the sense of Lakoff” (Langacker, 2004, p282). Lakoff (1987) points out that linguistic expressions 
derive their meaning from being associated with cognitive models. Cognitive models are meaningful in that they put us 
in touch with preconceptual structures in our bodily experience of functioning as a being of a certain sort in an 
environment of a certain sort. By these models we organize our knowledge and in the process of organizing category 
structure, prototype effects come to exist as by-products. Cognitive models characterize not only conceptual structure 
but also syntactic structure. “These cognitive models fundamental to our experience and our conception of the world are 
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claimed to underlie the prototypical value of certain grammatical constructs pertaining to clause structure” (Langacker, 
2004). We hold the central idea in cognitive grammar that grammatical construction is not autonomous but dependent 
on semantic structure. The meaning comes from our bodily interactions with the world, or rather, the cognitive models 
with which we perceive the world and organize our knowledge. This is consistent with the fact that the cluster of 
properties of prototype is not something objectively in the world independent of any being, but is the result of our 
interactions as part of our physical and cultural environment. Actually, we experience the properties characterizing the 
prototype of transitivity as a gestalt; that is, the complex of properties occurring together is more basic to our 
experience than their separate occurrence. Such a gestalt is often representable by the cognitive model which is 
understood as being psychologically simpler than its parts. As Lakoff (1987) puts it “in the case of experiential gestalts, 
however, the reverse may hold: a complex description may correspond to a cognitively simple concept, while a 
relatively simple description of one of the parts of the concept may be cognitively more complex” (p491). Due to their 
experiential nature, we are in a position to assume that the cluster of semantic properties of prototype transitivity come 
from cognitive models. Additionally, the clusters of attributes done by Hopper and Thompson and other linguists offer 
us a hint that transitivity approximates the notion of EVENT rather than STATE. That is to say the category of 
transitivity is based on a cognitive model describing not a state but an event. So we make a further assumption that 
Langacker’s canonical event model seems to provide the basis for the organization of a prototype transitive clause. Now 
we can go on to discuss the semantic defining features of the prototype transitive clause on the basis of canonical event 
model. 
2. Semantic properties 
In cognitive grammar, the role of archetypes is employed to describe the features of prototype in grammatical 
constructions. “These archetypes reflect our experience as mobile and sentient creatures and as manipulators of physical 
objects.” (Langacker, 2004, p285). In line with the canonical event model, we would tend to anticipate that the subject 
in the prototypical transitive clause plays the role of archetypal agent which refers to a person who is a volitional human 
actor, acting in the most specifically human possible way to cause some perceptible change of state in a perceptible 
object. That is, subject is the source of energy transmission to an external object. On the polar opposite, the object is 
expected to play the role of archetypal patient which is an inanimate object that stands at the end of energy flow, 
absorbing external transmitted energy and as a result undergoing an internal change of state. The event is coded by the 
prototypical verbs which definitely describe an activity which causes a change in the patient. In English, they are verbs 
such as kill, break, hurt, make, create, improve, clean, increase, decrease, stop, move, sadden, melt, heat, warm, hide, 
cover, give, and send. They all describe a change of one kind or another. According to Tsunoda, other transitive verbs 
such as hit are often used in examples of transitive clauses, but they are not prototype transitive verbs because though 
the activities they describe impinge on the patient, they do not necessarily imply a change in it. In contrast, killing, for 
instance, necessarily implies such a change. That is the death of the victim. These semantic properties deriving from the 
canonical cognitive model correspond to the work of Hopper and Thompson (1980) and Lakoff (1977), including the 
following semantic properties which typical transitive sentences have in common: 
(1) The two participants are highly individuated, ie. They are discrete, specific entities (from this it follows that both 
the NPs in the construction have specific reference), distinct both from each other, and from the background 
environment. 
(2) The event is initiated by the referent for the subject NP, i.e. by the agent. Responsibility for the event thus lies 
exclusively with the agent. 
(3) The agent acts consciously and volitionally, and thus controls the event. Since consciousness and volition are 
typical human attributes, it follows that the agent is typically a human being. 
(4) As a consequence of the agent’s action, something happens to the patient, i.e. the referent of the object NP. The 
effect on the patient is intended by the agent. Often, though by no means necessarily, the patient is inanimate. 
(5) After the occurrence of the event, the patient is in a different state from before the event. Usually, the difference is 
one which would highly perceptible to an overlooking observer. 
(6) The event is construed as punctual. Even though the event necessarily has temporal extension, the internal 
structure of the event, and the intermediate states between its inception and termination, are not in focus. 
(7) The agent’s action on the patient usually involves direct physical contact, and the effect on the patient is 
immediate. 
(8) The event has a causative component—the agent’s action causes the patient to undergo a change. 
(9) Typically, agent and patient are not only clearly differentiated entities; often they also stand in an adversative 
relationship. 
(10) Finally, the events reported by the construction are real, not imaginary, hypothetical, or counterfactual. Hence, 
central instantiations of the construction are realis. 
(Taylor, 2001, p207) 
B.  Syntactic Properties of the Prototype 
A grammatical structure is claimed to be characteristically symbolic in cognitive grammar. A symbolic structure is 
bipolar, consisting of a semantic pole and a phonological pole (Langacker, 2004, p76). If the semantic pole is 
suppressed, then the symbolic relationships cease to exist, and what remains is nothing but undifferentiated 
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LANGUAGE STUDIES 959
© 2016 ACADEMY PUBLICATION
phonological structure. Thus grammatical constructions are not autonomous from semantics but based on it. Then how 
do they get meaning? Cognitive grammar makes it clear that grammar is a radical category of grammatical 
constructions, where each construction pairs a cognitive model (which characterizes meaning) with corresponding 
aspects of linguistic form (Lakoff, 1987, p463). Given such a view of the nature of syntactic structures, we can expect 
that every grammatical construction has its meaning derived from cognitive models or schemas. Based on the cognitive 
model of prototypical transitivity, we list some syntactic properties pertaining to the prototype transitive clauses. 
1. Linguistic expressions of two participants 
According to Lyons (1968), clauses may be classified in terms of the number of the participants. He employs such 
convenient terms as one-place, two-place, etc. In line with the terminology, transitive clauses are at least two-place. 
Anyhow, there are certain three-place transitive clauses. Most instances of intransitive clauses are one-place, for 
example, John sat down. Semantically speaking, the canonical event model clearly shows that a prototype transitive 
clause contains two participants. First and foremost, syntactically, the prototypical transitive clause necessarily includes 
the linguistic expressions of the agent and the patient. However, there are clauses which contain two participants 
semantically only linguistically expressing either of them. Take the following examples as an illustration. 
(1) He drinks wine. 
(2) He drinks between meals. 
(3) He always aims to please. 
(4) He pleased his parents. 
(5) Peter washed the dishes and Marsha dried. 
(6) He helped his mother dry the dishes. 
Drink is used transitively with an object in (1), which is obviously two-place. In terms of semantics, (1) has two 
participants. Syntactically speaking, both of them are linguistically coded by the pronoun he and the noun wine. 
However, in (2), drink is used intransitively without an object. It also semantically contains two participants, for 
drinking necessarily requires an energy initiator, the drinker and the energy receiver, a drink, but in terms of linguistic 
expressions, it only expresses the drinker with the pronoun he, leaving the drink unmentioned. This is the similar case in 
sentences (3) and (4). In (3) the agent is linguistically expressed while the patient is indicated by the verb please rather 
than coded by nouns or pronouns. However, (4) is a two-place, with the two participants syntactically realized by the 
pronoun he and the noun parents. The last two examples bear the similarity as well. Though the verb dry in (5) 
semantically demands an object, the object is not expressed linguistically. But in (6) the two participants are realized by 
he and dish. The above examples show that the linguistic expressions of the two participants are primarily coded by 
means of words, such as nouns and pronouns. Since the cognitive model contains two or more than two participants, the 
prototype transitive clauses must show the linguistic expression of them. 
2. Passivizability 
Passivization is a manipulation which makes active sentences such as Tom killed him into passive sentence He was 
killed by Tom. In this process, the object of the active sentence is turned into the subject of the passive sentence. The 
two sentences are different in their respective viewpoints. Take the above sentence as an example, in the active one, its 
viewpoint is neutral. On the other hand, in the passive sentence, the speaker describes the event only from the Patient’s 
point of view. However, not all the events or states expressed in transitive sentences can be described from the Patient’s 
point of view. Bolinger (1977) gives the following sentences. 
(7) Private Smith deserted the army. 
(8) ? The army was deserted by Private Smith. 
(9) All the generals deserted the army. 
(10) The army was deserted by all its generals. 
How does it occur that there is the difference in acceptability of the above passive sentences? Considering the verb 
itself seems impossible to answer this question. According to cognitive grammar’s view, the meaning of the whole 
active sentence may well seem to be correlated with their passivizability. Besides, Bolinger also believes that 
passivization cannot be defined on a particular set of verbs. He proposes “the hypothesis for the passive in English that 
the subject in a passive construction is conceived to be a true Patient, i.e. to be genuinely affected by the action of the 
verb” (Bolinger, 1975, p67). Apart from that, Rice (1987) investigates the strong correlation between passivizability and 
especially the parameters of transitivity proposed by Hopper and Thompson, which we have taken as the semantic 
properties of the prototype transitive clauses. According to him, the degree to which sentences are removed from or 
approximate transitive prototypes has to do with their passivizability. The above studies made by different linguists 
make it clear that passivizability cannot be explained by verbs, but closely relates with transitivity or rather semantic 
features of transitivity. How does passivizability correlate with the semantic properties? Semantically speaking, the 
prototype transitive clauses describe the event in which the discrete physical entities, usually animate, driven by flowing 
energy, cause the affected object to move or change and possibly to interact with other entities. Obviously, the objects in 
such clauses are really affected by the action of the verbs. Consistent with Bolinger’s proposition, the object is a true 
Patient, capable of acting as the Subject in the passive sentence. In this way, the correlation between passivizability and 
transitivity is realized by the semantic property—the affectedness of objects. No doubt, the prototype transitive clause 
can definitely be paraphrased into passives and passivizability should be one of the syntactic properties of prototypical 
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transitive clauses. 
III.  THE DEVIATION OF TRANSITIVITY 
A.  Subject Deviation 
The prototype clause is associated with a conceptual archetype that constitutes its prototypical value. In a prototype 
transitive clause, the subject and object approximate the archetypal role of Agent and Patient. However, not all 
participants in such a clause closely match the archetypes in the canonical event model. Owing to this fact, there are 
non-central transitive clauses, deviating from the more central members to varying extent. The degree of transitivity is 
in a negative relationship with the extent to which the clause deviates from the prototype. In other words, corresponding 
to the above discussion, the more determinant properties a transitive clause lacks, the less typical it is. We will in this 
section mainly discuss those non-central transitive clauses in which the subjects apart from their typical role as Agent 
while the objects still play the archetypal role of Patient. The following groups of sentences may explicitly illustrate this 
point. 
(11) The lightening destroyed the building. 
(12) The floods damaged several houses. 
(13) The electric shock killed him. 
(14) The sun burned her skin. 
(15) The computer has solved the problem. 
(16) The key opened the door. 
Sentences (11) to (15) are similar cases due to the fact that the “subject plays the role of external causer; that is, it 
expresses the unwitting (generally inanimate) cause of an event” (Quirk, 1985, p743). In (11), the subject the lightening 
does not play the archetype role of Agent in that the inanimate force does not act on the object consciously or purposely. 
In spite of this, it is still highly transitive. It reports on events rather than states because “only sentences which report on 
events can be inserted into the clefting expression What happened was that S” (Taylor, 2001, p209). Thus it is 
acceptable to say that What happened was that the lightening destroyed the building. Similarly, it makes sense to insert 
this expression into (12) to (14). In them, the subjects floods, electric shock, sun are also inanimate, so they act in an 
unconscious way to cause a change in the state of the objects. Though the subjects lose a certain semantic property, the 
objects are in the Patient position and the syntactic properties are all reserved. For instance, all of them have their 
corresponding passives. The degree of transitivity in this group of sentences is rather high. 
The tendency to have a metaphorical perception of agentiveness is conspicuous in (15) to (16) whose subjects are 
non-agentive, but “have the role of instrument; that is, the entity (generally inanimate) which an agent uses to perform 
an action or instigate a process” (ibid.). Metaphorical extension is thus not restricted to the meanings of lexical items 
only; it also motivates the semantic extension of a syntactic construction. As regards to these untypical transitive clauses, 
“a relation of metonymy between an agent and the instrument he uses to affect the patient similarly sanctions the use of 
an instrument in subject position” (Taylor, 2001, p214). The subjects computer, key are able to affect the objects in part 
because they are related with the animate agents who actually carry out the action of solving and opening. On the other 
hand, the success of the action, to some extent, depends on the properties of the instrument. Obviously, the successful 
solving of the problem cannot be realized without the efficiency of the computer. For this reason, the transitive clause 
with the instrument in the subject position is restricted to only limited productivity. Schlesinger (1981) also makes 
arguments in connection with this low productivity. In this respect, this type of transitive clauses is further removed 
from the prototype. 
Now we turn to discuss the untypical clauses encoded by mental verbs. They also contain two participants, but the 
subject in Langacker’s term is the experiencer who is responsible for the intellectual, perceptual or emotive mental 
activity. Take the following sentences as an example. 
(17) She likes the gifts. 
(18) They admired his life story. 
(19) We’ve forgotten your address. 
(20) I regret the incident. 
(21) We noticed the warning on the door. 
(22) I heard a quarrel next door. 
(23) We all respect our president. 
Sentences (17) to (23) involve mental activities realized by the mental verbs like, admire, forget, regret, notice, hear, 
and respect. The subjects are usually human beings, but they arguably do not play the archetypical role of Agent 
because they make no direct physical contact and impose no immediate change on the object. Since there is not any 
perceptible affection on the object, we may well to expect that they may not possess the syntactic property of 
passivisability. Contrary to our expectation, clauses encoded by many of the mental verbs can be passivized. For 
example, (17) can be passivized as The gifts are liked by him. The reason why this happens is that in metaphorical sense, 
the experiencer may bring effects on the object. Due to his fondness for the gift, he may possibly grasp the gift closely, 
hold it tightly into his arms and consequently results in the change in the state of the gift. Though sentence (17) 
possesses the syntactic property of passivizability, the degree of transitivity is comparatively low, because they lose so 
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many semantic properties, such as punctuality, and direct physical contact. Even further removed from the prototype are 
transitive clauses which describe a relation between entities, not some action performed by one entity with respect to 
another. These sentences are coded by verbs such as have, own, and possess. For example: 
(24) Peter owns a piano. 
(25) They have a beautiful house. 
(26) He possesses an immense treasure. 
(27) The jar contains coffee. 
(28) My tent sleeps four people. 
(29) The bag holds six pounds. 
(30) The house resembles a castle. 
(31) The computer cost $400. 
The subjects go with the verbs used statively. That is, the transitive clause is so deviated from the prototype that they 
describe states or rather relations between entities. According to Quirk, in (24) to (26), the subjects have a recipient role 
while (27) to (29) have the locative role designating the place of the state. Since they all indicate the relation, we 
include them together in this group. According to Taylor’s way of identifying more marginal transitive sentences, 
instances in this group cannot be inserted into What happened was that S and do not allow clefting with do. Transitive 
clauses containing the locative subjects normally have no passive counterparts either. For instance, it is infelicitous to 
say Four people are slept by my tent. Six pounds are held by the bag. As to the last two sentences, they also designate 
relations. The two entities in (30) do not have the role of Agent and the Patient because the subject the house does not 
obviously act upon the object a castle. Since the object is not affected by any physical force, it is unlikely to stand as the 
subject of a passive sentence. A castle is resembled by the house is ungrammatical. The last sentence is in the similar 
case, it does not make any sense to say $400 have been cost by the book. In addition, the subject can have the temporal 
role of designating its time in even more marginal transitive clauses. For instance, 1980s saw great changes in China. 
Tuesday witnessed another slaying. “The fifth day saw our departure” (Taylor, 2001, p214). The clauses in this group 
deviate further from the prototype, describing state, showing less causation and some of them having no passives. The 
productivity of them is rather low because the acceptability of the marginal clauses may be affected by certain factors 
such as tense and aspect. Now we will in the next part deal with deviation due to the very unpatient-like entities 
functioning as the direct object of a transitive sentence. 
B.  Object Deviation 
In some cases, the direct object NP does not refer to the archetypal Patient, affected by the action of the Agent, but 
quite possibly has the role of recipient, result, location, etc. In line with Quirk’s system, we firstly discuss the locative 
role of the direct object. Instantiations are as follows: 
(32) We passed a big bridge. 
(33) He crossed the street. 
(34) She swam the river. 
(35) We have climbed the mountain. 
(36) They walked the financial district of a city. 
(37) The dog jumped the gate. 
(38) The enemies have surrounded the village. 
(39) We occupy a nice house. 
(40) We had inhabited the city for several years. 
In (32), passing is an activity involving only one participant, the subject we. Thus, superficially, the object bridge 
may seem to be adverbials with an omitted preposition by. Sentence (32) can also be encoded by an intransitive clause 
We passed by the big bridge. However, that the bridge is not adverbial but the direct object of pass is confirmed by the 
existence of its passive counterpart—the big bridge was passed by us, in which the bridge assumes the role of the 
subject. Although the NP designates place, it is able to stand in the position of the direct object. Other verbs in the above 
sentences such as cross, swim, climb, walk, and jump behave in a similar way. Meanwhile, we also include those 
transitive clauses with locative objects after such verbs as occupy and inhabit, where no preposition can be inserted. In 
this group, the transitive clauses deviate from the prototype and lose some prototypical properties in that the direct 
objects are more like setting or path, etc. than the archetypal Patient. The ability of the NPs to take the role of subjects 
in the passives confirms their status as direct objects. However, the production of this type is restricted in some way. For 
example, though we have The child crawled across the floor, The child crawled the floor is not appropriate. This limit 
in productivity suggests that they are non-central transitive clauses. We now turn to another kind of object deviation. 
That is, the resultant object, which, according to Quirk, refers to an object whose referent exists only by virtue of the 
activity indicated by the verb. For example: 
(41) He is digging a hole. 
(42) Mother cooked a dinner for the entire family. 
(43) She is writing a letter. 
(44) He made a cake for me. 
(45) John has drawn a new picture. 
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In prototypical transitive clause the Agent does something to affect the Patient, but this does not apply to the 
untypical clause with a resultant object. Take sentence (41) to illustrate the point. He is digging a hole is different from 
He is digging the ground. The former does not imply he is doing something to a hole while the latter does. He makes 
physical contact with the ground and transfers energy to it, which results in the making of a hole. Therefore, ground is 
the affected object, but hole is the resultant object. By the same token, dinner in (42) is resultant while potatoes in 
Mother has cooked potatoes is the affected object. The thing which my mother directly contacts is a variety of 
vegetables or meat, etc. rather than the dinner. Dinner is the consequence of her washing, cutting and cooking the 
vegetables or meat. Letter, cake and picture are respectively the result of the action of writing, making and drawing 
carried out by the agentive subjects. 
We feel the necessity to talk about the recipient role of the direct object here. Though the direct objects are usually 
inanimate, some personal pronouns or animate nouns are likely to be the objects. These objects more often than not 
have the recipient role. For example: 
(46) We paid the taxi driver. 
(47) The waiter wined the guests. 
(48) He served us all. 
In the above examples, the taxi driver, the guests, us are respectively the direct objects, but they are not prototypical 
in that they do not undergo any direct physical contact done by the subject but play the role of recipient or receiver. This 
construction is neither fully productive. On this point, Talyor (2001: 213) makes it clear that though (47) is acceptable, 
such sentences as He hampagne the guests, He beered the guests and He coffeed the guests are not idiomatic.  
C.  Subject and Object Deviation 
We have so far respectively discussed the subject deviation and object deviation. It contributes to the untypicality of 
those transitive clauses. The fact that there are clauses in which both subjects and objects are not prototypical Agent and 
Patient necessitates our devotion to this section. We intend to instantiate the point from the following untypical 
transitive clauses. 
(49) I had a wonderful dream. 
(50) His teaching benefits us all. 
(51) John took a fall. 
In (49), the object dream is eventive in that we have I dreamed. The subject I in this case is not agentive as usual, it 
takes the role of  xperience. The subject his teaching is the inanimate entity and closely related with an agent. 
Metaphorical extension allows the possibility of the instrument as an agent standing in the subject position. On the other 
hand, the object us is more like recipient. Lastly, since John, the animate subject, is used in nonvolitional sense, it is the 
affected subject. The object fall is also eventive as the word fall functions as verb in John fell. In general, the transitive 
clauses are non-central due to the fact that either their subjects or objects, even both of them, deviate to a varying extent 
from the archetypal Agent and Patient. During this process, the subjects and the objects lose one or another semantic 
property, so some syntactic properties are lost as well. The more properties the clause loses the lower level of 
transitivity in the clause and the further it deviates from the prototype. 
D.  Explanation of the Deviation 
According to Langacker (2004), “the canonical event model represents the normal observation of a prototypical 
action” (p286). The central transitive clause describes canonical actions in which the subject and direct object conform 
quite well to the agent and patient archetypes. But in actuality, matters are far more complex in coding an event, 
because coding involves two sides—conceptualization and linguistic structure, which deals with the relationship 
between a conceptualization one wishes to express and the activated linguistic structures. On the one hand, the ways of 
construing a given event are countless and there is possibility that a particular event conception deviates from the 
prototype in any manner or to any degree. As we have discussed above, the object has the extension from patient to 
locative, temporal, eventive, and cognate role. By the same token, the subject can be extended from the agent to the 
instrumental role, external causer, experiencer, recipient in some extended clauses. Take the experiencer role as an 
example, the transitive clause coded by mental verbs like see, love, fear, like describes the relationship between an 
experiencer and some notion with which that experiencer establishes mental contact without any transmission of energy 
from the subject to the object. Metaphor plays an important role in the process of extension. For instance, it enables the 
agentive subject in a prototypical transitive clause extends to the experiencer. “This extension is grounded 
metaphorically, either through specific metaphors such as SEEING IS TOUCHING, or more generally, through the 
shared path-like nature attributed to such phenomena as energy flow, gaze and directed attention (Langacker, 2004, 
p304). On the other hand, various alternate grammatical devices are commonly available to code the same situation 
alternatively. How the untypical event perception is construed by speakers determines the way in which the clause is 
linguistically coded. That is to say, a conception that does not closely match any of the archetypes may be susceptible to 
alternate codings, each reflecting a different construal. For instance, in the sentence He carpeted the room, the observer 
takes the room as something he acted upon and affected while in He laid a carpet in the room, the room is obviously 
considered as the place in which the subject carrying out action. Consequently, these two ways of coding the same 
situation represent different construal of the NP the room. Apart from that, we have the transitive clause We had a swim 
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or He had a talk. This scene can also be coded intransitively: We swam or He talked. Finally, when it comes to construe 
the untypical event, we tend to structure the unfamiliar conception with reference to familiar ones and connect the 
abstract conception with more concrete ones. This cognitive tendency accounts in part for the abundance of non-central 
transitive clauses. 
In sum, a prototype transitive clause is a basic clause type associating with the conceptual archetypal Agent and 
Patient and representing the most natural construal of events. As it is the obvious way of coding an event linguistically, 
it possibly forecloses other options. But there are great chances that the notions of an event are not archetypal but 
deviate from the prototype to a varying degree. When these notions are encountered, the event is possibly to be coded 
differently depending on specific circumstance or the speaker’s wish. As metaphor is an important way responsible for 
the lexical extension, many of the transitive clause extensions are realized through the metaphorical way as well.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In cognitive linguistics, word and syntax form a continuum. Therefore, like a word, transitivity as a category, has its 
prototypical meaning and non-prototypical meaning, showing high transitivity and low transitivity. The conceptual 
meaning of transitivity relies on the canonical event cognitive model. The corresponding syntactic pattern is the SVO 
construction. The prototypical SVO construction shows the prototypical transitivity and the non-prototypical 
construction shows the non-prototypical transitivity. The degree of transitivity is in a negative relationship with the 
extent to which the clause deviates from the prototype. Since the situations are in one way or another different from the 
prototypical transitive event, the meaning of transitivity will extend to different degrees. 
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